In many retail gasoline markets, prices follow a saw-toothed cycle first posited by Edgeworth (1925) and formalised by Maskin & Tirole (1988) . A growing literature explores driving factors behind such cycles, most particularly in Canada and the US. This paper explores price cycles in a retail gasoline market in Australia with a unique regulatory environment that provides a census of data. We make use of a threshold regression model, and pay particular attention to local market effects and market structure. Both are novel in the study of retail petroleum prices.
Introduction
Retail gasoline prices in many jurisdictions follow a saw-toothed pattern, shown in Figure Two and called an Edgeworth Cycle. Figure 
Figure One about here
Note that prices all seem to rise together, and often to roughly the same level. Clearly, Shell head-office in Perth plays a major role in determining when and by how much each Shellbranded outlet increases its price.
Wang (2009) studies such co-ordination during the upwards phase of the price cycle. However, note that the downward phase of the cycle exhibits a wide band of price paths indicating that each outlet acts far more independently of head office during this phase of the cycle. Here, we explore what drives prices in both phases of the cycle, utilising Hansen's (1999) threshold regression model to differentiate between downward and upward phases and we employ a novel measure of market structure.
Section Two of this paper briefly reviews the empirical price cycle literature, while Section
Three provides an explanation of threshold regression models. Section Four provides an overview of the approach we take to obtain a structural measure of local market competition.
Section Five provides a brief overview of the Perth data used. Section Six introduces the model and its results. Section Seven concludes.
Edgeworth Cycles and Threshold Regression Models
Price Cycles were first posited as an equilibrium of a dynamic game by Edgeworth (1925) and formalised by Maskin & Tirole (1988) , who named the cycles after Edgeworth . Their distinctive pattern is shown in Figure Two . Maskin & Tirole (1988) show that Edgeworth Cycles are one equilibrium of a repeated, alternate move game when symmetric duopolists produce an homogenous good and who use Markovperfect strategies to choose prices from a finite grid, provided that the discount rate is sufficiently high.. The cycles arise because, for prices above the minimum, a small reduction in price is sufficient to capture the whole market from a rival until it moves again. At the minimum, it is in the interests of both parties for prices to move up again, but not for either party to be the firstmover. They thus play a war of attrition. However, once one firm moves, since the optimal response by its rival will be a slight undercut, the initiator of the price rise has an incentive to increase price by as much as possible in order to maximise its benefits over the price cycle.
Figure Two about here
The model has been extended by Eckert (2003) , who allows firms to be of different sizes, by Lau (2001) , who shows that the necessary strategic commitment can arise in simultaneous move games as well, and by Noel (2008) , who relaxes a host of assumptions such as identical marginal costs, elasticities of demand and product characteristics, as well as extending the model to the three-firm case.
There is considerable empirical evidence that prices in retail gasoline markets often follow an
Edgeworth cycle, notably in Canada (Eckert 2003 , Eckert & West 2004a ,b, 2005a , Atkinson, Eckert & West 2009 , Atkinson 2009 and Noel 2007a , but also in the US (Lewis 2009 and Doyle, Muehlegger & Samphantharak 2008) and Australia (Wang 2009 and ACCC 2007) . Lewis (2009) and Doyle, Muehlegger & Samphantharak (2008) follow Lewis's approach of measuring the extent to which a cycle is saw-toothed in nature by using the median change in price, which is then regressed against a number of explanatory variables such as the market share of independent firms, station density, population, income, number of cars per household and land area. In Bloch & Wills-Johnson (2010a), we follow a similar approach using the Perth case study that is also used in this paper. Wang (2009) focuses on the increasing phase of price cycles, and explores what the pattern of first movement amongst the brands in Perth reveals about the mixed strategies followed by each brand in the relevant price-wars. In Bloch & WillsJohnson (ibid) we also explore the use of mixed strategies, through the use of spectral analysis.
The remaining authors consider the entire price path and endeavour to uncover what drives prices during both phases of the cycle. In order to do so, one must consider how to incorporate potential differences in behaviour in the increasing and decreasing phases of a price cycle.
Atkinson, Eckert & West (2009 ), Atkinson (2009 ) and Eckert (2002 address this issue by treating the upward and downward phases in separate regressions, whilst Eckert & West (2004b) do so by allowing the coefficients to vary over the four phases of the cycle they identify in their work. Noel (2007a Noel ( ,b, 2008 Noel ( , 2009 ) uses a Markov-Switching regression, which is more computationally intensive. Here, we are able to utilise Hansen's (1996 Hansen's ( , 1999 Hansen's ( , 2000 threshold regression model as we have a census of data, not a sample, and can thus observe turning points.
Threshold Regression Models
Threshold regression assumes that the model behaves differently when a certain critical variable is above or below a threshold value. The approach's novelty lies in allowing the data to determine where the threshold should lie, rather than imposing the threshold externally.
The threshold regression approach has many applications, with Hansen's three seminal papers (1996, 1999, 2000) widely cited. It has found perhaps its widest application in macroeconomics, particularly in problems concerning economic growth (see, for example, Papageorgio, 2002 , Savides & Stengos, 2000 , Deidda & Fattouh, 2002 , and indeed Hansen himself, 1996 . A number of authors have also used it in micro-economic analysis (see for example Huang & Yang, 2006 , who study cigarette demand and Boetel, Hoffmann & Liu, 2007, who study the demand for hogs). There have also been a number of studies that have examined the rockets and feathers hypothesis in retail petroleum markets using threshold autoregression models (see Chan, 1993) , such as Godby et al, 2000 and Chen et al 2005. However , to the knowledge of the authors, this study represents the first time the model has been used to separate the stages of an Edgeworth Cycle in retail petroleum markets, although Eckert's (2002) approach is similar.
Modelling Market Structure
An important aspect of this paper is the way in which we model market structure. Rather than use an indirect measure such as seller density or, as in the Edgeworth cycle literature above, the penetration of independents, we develop a simple theoretical model of bilateral interaction and use this to test who competes with whom. We collect these bilateral links to form a network that summarises the structure of competition in the marketplace as a whole and use simple graphcutting tools to delineate local sub-markets. We then use measures of network structure from the mathematical sociology literature to summarise the position of each retail gasoline outlet in the overall structure of the global market and local sub-markets. These measures are used as regressors in the model outlined in Section Six. We describe the process of network formation and division briefly below, and in more detail in Bloch and Wills-Johnson (2010b).
The simple theoretical model is based upon that of Hoover (1937) and McBride (1983) , who study how spatial differentiation can give rise to local market power. 1 Our point of departure is an assumption that consumers come to the retailer rather than having goods delivered to them, and this requires the retailer to set a single price for all consumers without knowing from whence each has come.
We examine a duopoly where each firm sells one unit of an homogenous good to identical consumers whose travel plans take them past one retail gasoline outlet but who must deviate to frequent the other (meaning purchase from the former is costless but that from the latter is not).
Each firm has two choices; set a higher price than its rival and collect rents from those customers for whom deviation to its rival is costly or set a price lower than its rival and endeavour to steal market share.
The advantages of each choice change depending upon overall price levels, and it is relatively simple to show the situations whereby this will give rise to an Edgeworth Cycle (see Bloch & Wills-Johnson, 2010c) . It is also relatively simple to show that the minima of such price cycles will be related for in a consistent fashion where firms compete (ibid). Moreover, if marginal costs and the proportion passing each outlet first are equal, one can easily show that the minimum of each price cycle for each outlet in the duopoly will be the same (see Bloch & WillsJohnson, 2010c , for an illustration of these results).
This gives rise to a simple test of connection. We first form the series of price cycle minima for each gasoline station by taking the lowest price in the three days prior to each price increase of greater than five percent. 2 We then undertake a simple statistical test of the difference between the means for each pair of outlets within five kilometres of one another. 3 Where there is no statistically significant difference between the means, we deem the two outlets to be connected.
By collecting these connected pairs, we are able to construct a network that summarises the patterns of connection in the overall market.
We then divide this network in to a series of submarkets, using an approach pioneered by Gould (1967) , and subsequently widely used in geography (see, for example, Cliff, Haggett & Ord, 1979 , Boots, 1985 , O'hUallachain, 1985 and Straffin, 1980 . The network is first converted into an adjacency matrix; a symmetric, zero-one matrix where a zero in the ij th position indicates that nodes i and j are not connected, and a one indicates that they are. We then take the eigenvectors of this adjacency matrix. The first eigenvector (that is, the eigenvector associated with the largest eigenvalue) has all positive entries. In order to be orthogonal to the first, the remaining eigenvectors must contain positive and negative elements. Gould (1967) The results of following Gould's (1967) approach using the second to sixth eigenvectors (after which the signal to noise ratio makes it impossible to uncover further structure) divides the market into eight distinct sub-markets. Figure Three shows the overall market with the eight sub-markets superimposed. The dark-grey area represents the Swan River, which divides the city North from South, and the light-grey line represents the main north-south freeway, which divides East from West. Placement of each station is approximate, but roughly correlates to the physical shape of the Perth market. 4 The different shaded dots represent different brands.
Figure Three about here
There are a wide variety of measures which can be used to summarise network structure in the mathematical sociology literature. 5 We use one measure of centrality, and three measures which reflect Burt's (1992) notion of a structural hole in a network. Centrality is measured using the approach of Bonacich (1972 Bonacich ( , 1987 , who bases his measure on the leading eigenvector of the adjacency matrix.
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The importance of structural holes, or the parts of the network where there are few connections between densely intra-connected sub-groups, is suggested by Burt (1992) . Burt uses a number of measures to capture structural holes. The effective size of the network for a given node is the sum of the non-redundant portions of its relationships with all other nodes in the network, and ranges from one to N, the total number of nodes in the network. 7 Further, the efficiency of the network for a given node is its effective size divided by N. A more efficient network is one where structural holes are better situated from the perspective of the node for which efficiency is being calculated. Finally, constraint is the absence of structural holes, meaning that, even if a node severs its direct connection with another node, indirect connections mean that it is still restricted by that node. Burt (1992) defines constraint as the sum of the proportion of network time spent on connections with a given node and across all other nodes which that node and the node for which constraint is being calculated are connected to. We make use of Burt's (1992) measures of efficiency and constraint, and also limited use of his measure of redundancy.
Perth Market and Data Used
The data used in the threshold regression models come from Perth, Western Australia, which is governed by a unique regulatory regime known as FuelWatch. Every gasoline retailer must report its next-day price to the regulator by 2pm. The regulator then publicises those prices, which comes into effect at 6am the next day and must remain in effect for 24 hours. Quite apart from the effect this regulatory regime has on strategy (see Wang, 2009) , or the influence it may or may not have on the price level (see Davidson, 2008 , for an account of this controversy), it provides the researcher with a census of price data. This makes Perth an excellent case study.
Considerable data on the Perth market and on retail petroleum in Australia in general, can be found in the various recent reports by the ACCC (2007, 2008, 2009 ). Here, we focus on the data which are used in the analysis in Section Six. The data are summarised in Table One . Coles supermarkets and Shell. The data do not cover all outlets in Perth, omitting some on the outskirts of the city, those for which the data series are incomplete (usually because they are new, or were closed for long periods during the sample period owing to a change in ownership) and those for which the retailing of fuel is not a core business (such as taxi depots and marinas).
Data on demand come from the ABS Census (ABS, 2006) whilst the remaining data come from
FuelWatch, or are based on data in the FuelWatch database.
8 Table Two provides information on branding, ownership structures, presence of convenience stores and location of competitors. Caltex has the largest market share, followed by BP and Shell. Mobil, the fourth of the Majors (vertically integrated, multi-national firms active in refining, wholesale and retail in Australia), has a much smaller market share. Independent chains (Gull, Liberty and Peak) make up roughly a quarter of the sample, making them collectively more important than either Shell or Mobil and slightly smaller than BP.
Supermarkets are more prevalent today than in the dataset, which precedes the entry of Coles, and is from a time when only small numbers of Woolworths outlets existed. 9 Today, the two comprise almost half of overall Fuel sales in Australia (ACCC, 2007) .
Table Two about here
Company controlled outlets comprise roughly half of those in Table Two, according to FuelWatch, which defines outlets owned directly by the Majors and outlets owned by their multisite franchisees as being company controlled. In Western Australia, Shell owns eight sites, BP owns five and Mobil none. Thus, most of the outlets listed as company controlled in Table Two are owned by one of the multi-site franchisees of these brands. Caltex has no multi-site franchises due to the terms of its 1995 merger with Ampol (see Walker & Woodward, 1996, for 8 The authors would like to thank the FuelWatch regulator for making this dataset available. 9 Coles and Woolworths are the two major grocery retailers in Australia. details). Instead, it uses single site franchises and a price-support scheme described in detail in Wang (2009) .
Convenience stores attached to retail petroleum outlets are often an important source of profits for the brands which own them. Caltex has two convenience store brands, whilst Shell, Mobil and BP have one apiece. Most Mobil outlets have a convenience store attached, as do around two-thirds of Caltex outlets. The shares for BP and Shell are each less than one-third. None of the independent brands has a convenience store brand, though some (Gull in particular) sell convenience store items in many of its outlets.
Although Perth is a relatively low-density city, retail petroleum outlets tend to be located along highways or at the major shopping centres which exist in some suburbs. This is in part due to zoning laws and in part due to a desire to be located at nodes of demand. For this reason, the distance to the nearest rival tends to be low (on average just over one km) and the number of competitors within five kilometres is nine.
10 Table Three summarises the demand data, showing city-wide averages and the upper and lower bounds of 95 percent confidence intervals around these averages.
Table Three about here
10 Distances between each pair of outlets were calculated manually using en electronic version of the Perth street directory. All distances were calculated based on the shortest distance by road. Table Four summarises the frequency of scores for global and local centrality, constraint and efficiency, which were calculated using the Ucinet software developed by Borgatti, Everett & Freeman (2002) . Note that we have normalised the centrality scores such that they range from zero to one, like the constraint and efficiency scores.
Table Four about here
Although prices and margins form the dependent variables in the regressions in Section Six, we also endeavour to capture some of the past history of these variables by including lags in the regressions, and through the "occurrence" families shown in 
Model Construction and Results
We now explore in more detail the threshold regression models and the results of the regressions undertaking using these models. The two models used are: 
Each of the variables is defined in Table One , with the exception of M, which is the gross retail margin (the daily retail price minus the daily terminal gate price from the same-branded wholesaler), DWD, which is the day of the week dummy and MD, which is the monthly dummy.
A threshold regression model can be expressed thus: 
In order to find the correct threshold, Hansen (1999) suggests performing a grid-search over a number of potential thresholds and choosing the threshold that gives the regression containing it the smallest sum of squared errors. We use an uneven grid with 33 intervals between zero and ten cents per litre, where the interval is 0.2 cpl (cents per litre) for price changes between zero and five cpl (where the threshold is most likely to lie) and 0.5 cpl thereafter, and find that the minimum sum of squared errors occurs at a change in price of 3.6 cpl. The same threshold is optimal for both models (price and margins) and indeed for most variants of each model with different independent variables omitted.
We assess the robustness of these results using tests suggested by Hansen (1999) . We first test first for the existence of a threshold following his bootstrap approach and find test statistics of 543801.4 for prices and 447339.1 for margins, with p-values of 0.0000 for both. This suggests that a threshold exists. We then test whether the threshold of 3.6 cpl is the most appropriate threshold by estimating a confidence interval around our result (see Hansen, 1999) and find that the confidence interval is very tight, suggesting 3.6 cpl is the most appropriate threshold.
Finally, because independent outlets often stagger their price increases over a couple of days whilst majors (BP, Shell, Mobil and Caltex) tend to jump in just one day, we explore whether the threshold is inadvertently capturing brand or ownership differences. We find that all brands and ownership types have roughly the same proportion of price changes above the threshold, which means it is unlikely that the threshold is inadvertently capturing brand or ownership differences in behaviour.
We now turn to the empirical estimation of Equations One and Two in the threshold regression form of Equation Four. We examine the consequences of removing various of the independent variables in the model, but the likelihood ratio test results associated with this process suggest that the most general model is also the one which performs best from a statistical perspective.
Since the model is estimate in the form of Equation Four, it contains θ 3 rather than θ 2 . The coefficients and variances for θ 2 are recovered manually. The results for the prices and margins regressions are presented in Tables Five and Six , where the prefix "T" indicates the upward phase of the cycle.
Tables Five and Six about here
Both models provide a good fit to the data and neither exhibits evidence of serial correlation.
Breusch-Pagan tests statistics indicate heteroscedasticity, which we address by using robust standard errors. 11 Since each regression is large (although many variables are dummies), there is potential scope for multicollinearity or misspecification in the regression models. We address this by testing many different formulations of the models, with different independent variables excluded. The results, particularly those pertaining to network characteristics, 12 are generally robust to these changes.
The set of variables measuring network structure provide reasonably consistent results across the two models, with centrality at both the global and local levels being negative (albeit only at the ten percent level for global centrality) during the downward phase of the price cycle and local centrality being positive during the upswing. Efficiency and constraint are positive at the local level, and constraint is negative at the global level, during the downswing, whilst neither is significant (except for constraint in the margins regression) during the upswing. EGOR coefficients are generally positive and statistically significant during both the downswing and the upswing. The interpretation of the network results are discussed in detail below
The SUBM results, when viewed geographically, suggest that sub-markets located next to each other do not necessarily price in a consistent fashion but rather follow prices of sub-markets which are further away.
Marginal costs, lagged prices and lagged margins are all roughly in line with expectations. All suggest that higher levels of marginal cost today, or prices or margins at the relevant lags imply higher levels today for prices or margins, with the exception of one-day lagged margins during the upswing. Note also that the coefficients on one-day lagged prices and margins are roughly 0.8 during the downswing, which highlights the small declines during that phase, and that both have much stronger effects than either marginal cost or seven-day lags. The same is true, vis-à-vis one-week lags during the upswing, but not marginal costs, which become much more important during the upswing, suggesting that the impetus to hike price increases as one nears marginal cost. Noel (2007a,b) has similar findings.
The results on the various station characteristics are reflective of the omitted dummy variables.
They suggest that Woolworth (BR4), the no-brand independents (BR6), Peak (BR9) and Wesco (BR11) all have higher prices than Shell during the downswing but that Gull (BR5) has lower prices and the other major brands (Caltex, BP and Mobil) have prices with no consistent pattern relative to Shell. The coefficients on branding are also much smaller during the downswing, which suggests that brand discipline is much less important during this phase. 13 Note especially the low coefficient on Gull. If it is a "maverick" leading prices downwards, it is not a particularly strong one.
For ownership types, the more independent types (TP1, TP2 and TP3) tend to have higher prices than company controlled outlets during the downswing, but lower prices during the upswing.
This potentially indicates that the majors (Shell, Caltex, BP and Mobil) are using the outlets that they have more control over (either through ownership or via franchising) to lead prices upwards. However, price supported outlets, all of which are owned by Caltex, show lower prices, potentially highlighting their use by Caltex in price wars to lead prices down and capture market share.
Demand coefficients are generally small, which suggests that demand effects are not particularly important. One clear exception to this is the number of vehicles per household, which has a small positive coefficient during the downward phase of the cycle, but a very large coefficient during the upward phase. Absent of model issues, this may be because markets with many cars represent the most profitable markets.
Being on a main road, near a competitor or having many competitors nearby all lead to lower prices during the downward phase of the price cycle, which reflects their pro-competition effects.
However, the number of competitors within five kilometres has a positive, significant coefficient during the upward phase, indicating that outlets packed more densely together raise price together, potentially a network-density effect.
The day of the week dummies indicate that prices tend to be higher earlier in the week. There is less evidence of seasonal factors, although the evidence from the downward phase of the price cycle tends to suggest that prices are lower in winter than in summer.
Finally, the occurrence family results tend to suggest, at least during the downswing, that there is a degree of mean-reverting behaviour occurring. The same is not true during the upswing, but this may be because each successive upswing is roughly a week apart, by which time price levels during the last upswing may well be ancient history.
We now explore in more detail the possible reasons for the findings outlined above, focussing most particularly on the network characteristic variables, which are the main focus of this analysis, and which provide some of the more counter-intuitive results.
The negative NCHAR2 coefficient during the downswing may be suggestive of outlets sitting at the junction points between sub-markets (the least constrained) acting to attenuate price signals travelling between sub-markets. This is partially confirmed by the fact that the submarkets neighbouring each other have opposite coefficients, which may indicate that the border outlets act to reduce information flow between submarkets.
Centrality does seem to be associated with leading prices downwards; both global (NCHAR4) and local (NCHAR8) centrality have negative coefficients. However, the most central stations at the local level also have the highest prices during an upswing, suggesting perhaps that they lead prices upwards in both the downswing and the upswing. This is s not too surprising, as such outlets would have the greatest ability to disseminate price information, owing to their location.
However, the size of the coefficient is very small; indicating that the effect is not substantial. It suggests the Majors can co-ordinate price increases through simply dictating them to all outlets bearing their brand, as argued by Wang (2009) .
The positive NCHAR5 and NCHAR6 coefficients at first appear counter-intuitive. A positive local efficiency coefficient suggests similar conclusions to the negative global constraint conclusion; that those in a good position (one for which the local market is efficient for the given retailer) can exploit the informational advantage that results and leverage some market power.
However, the positive local constraint coefficient does not fit this story. Further examination
shows that the outlets with the higher local constraint scores tend to be on the periphery of each local market (and indeed on the periphery of the Perth market as a whole), and we suggest that what is actually occurring is that these outlets, with access to customers unavailable to those not on the periphery, exploit their higher degree of local market power by charging these customers higher prices rather than fighting for the customers they must share with more centrally located outlets. Eckert & West (2005b) find that stations on the periphery of Canadian cities are less likely to close, which may be indicative of a similar effect to the one we find.
The EGOR results provide some confirmation for the efficiency results above. The outlets with the highest efficiency scores, sitting one or two steps away from the centre of each local network, are likely to have a large number of contacts in common with the centre, and hence high redundancy scores. These are the outlets that price higher than the centre, ameliorating the price decreases which originate there.
Conclusions
Gasoline prices in Perth, as in almost all capital cities in Australia and many cities in North America, follow an Edgeworth Cycle. Factors driving Edgeworth Cycles have been explored in other markets, and Wang (2009) studies the strategic interaction between brands in Perth that gives rise to the patterns of price increases. However, our study is the first to examine the factors driving prices across the whole Edgeworth Cycle in the context of the Perth market.
The paper introduces two innovations. First, Hansen's (1999) threshold regression technique is used for the first time to explore Edgeworth Cycles. It is particularly suited to the Perth market because, with a census of data, one can observe turning points in the cycle directly. Second, we introduce new measures of market structure. Rather than incorporating this indirectly through the use of proxies, such as seller density or the number of independents in the market, the paper introduces a method based on a simple model of bilateral interaction that gives rise to a network picture of competition in the marketplace as a whole. The network is cut into sub-markets based upon its structure (rather than some arbitrary delineation such as suburbs or post codes), and summarised relatively easily using summary statistics common in mathematical sociology.
These summary statistics are then incorporated into regression analyses as independent variables to highlight how structure influences pricing.
We find that market structure does indeed influence pricing, most particularly during the downswing and most particularly at the sub-market level. This confirms Wang's (2009) suspicion that local competition is most strongly at work during this phase of the cycle. We find that outlets facing the least constraint in the network as a whole, generally those which sit between sub-markets, have higher prices during the downswing, potentially indicating they act to reduce the flow of information between submarkets. We find that outlets for whom the relevant sub-market is efficient (in Burt's 1992 sense) act in a similar manner. We also find that the locally constrained outlets have higher prices during the downswing, but suspect that this is due to their peripheral location, and thus their ability to capture demand outside the sub-market (where they face less competition).
Once market structure is taken into account, we find that independents often have higher prices than the majors and that Caltex's price-supported outlets tend to have the lowest prices. Thus, price leadership by a particular brand, particularly during the downswing may be at least partially a function of market position. Similarly, we find that outlet density has a positive coefficient, which suggests that density is not a good proxy for the competitiveness of market structure.
The way we account for market structure here may have broader application than retail gasoline markets. In particular, it might be useful to both academic researchers and antitrust practitioners seeking to delineate market boundaries as part of tests associated with defining market power. This is perhaps the most useful result from this paper 
